The periphery of Europe by Seers, Dudley
THE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE
Proximity and dependence 
Members of the periphery 
Members of the core 
The spatial pattern 
Eastern Europe 
Long-term trends
The relevance of development studies 
Enlargement of the EEC?
--0O0--
THE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE^1^
(by Dudley Seers)
The group of theories constituting the 'dependence school' 
uses a broad core/periphery frame of analysis, without 
attempting to distinguish between different categories of core 
or peripheral countries, either economically or geographically.
When one looks at Europe with this framework in mind one sees 
that some European countries form a regional periphery, with 
special relationships to a European core. I shall ask 
what theoretical implications can be drawn and close by 
speculating on the future development of this European system.
Proximity and dependence
Except for a special school of regional economists, the economics 
profession, including writers on dependence, have usually 
neglected location. It is true of course that many of the most 
important linkages, especially in technology, are not greatly 
affected by distance. If a country relies on imported equipment 
(including arms), then this very largely determines its govern­
ment's room to manoeuvre, however remote the source of the 
equipment. Yet proximity to a dominant or core country 
transforms economic, political and cultural links. The closer 
a country is to those more industrialised, the lower the costs 
of transportation, the easier therefore for its exports to 
compete, but also the greater the danger that its industrialisation 
will be inhibited, especially if there are overland freight routes. 
Industries to make intermediate products and capital goods are
(l) I have benefitted from comments by a number of colleagues at 
IDS, and from assistance with research by Nezhat Sedaghat 
and Marja Kiljunen.
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not easy to establish anyway, especially in a small country, 
and the difficulty is all the greater where distance does not 
provide a natural tariff barrier.
But there are also other, less well-known, effects. Passenger 
fares depend on the length of the journey. The cheapness of 
moving people a few hundred miles opens up possibilities of 
labour migration to countries nearby. Though for many of the 
individuals concerned the migration is temporary, it can become 
for their country a permanent source of foreign exchange and 
employment. Emigrants not only regularly remit a fraction of 
their wages homewards, and spend them at home on regular visits, 
they bring capital back with them when they give up their work 
overseas. These relieve social pressures and provide valuable 
foreign exchange, but the foreign payments structure becomes 
adapted to them, and in time vulnerable to the labour and 
immigration policies of the government of the recipient country 
and to the level of economic activity there. Moreover, 
productive sectors are inhibited by the scarcity and cost of 
labour and the economy becomes dependent on foreign sources, 
even for necessities (especially food), financed in part by 
emigrants’ remittances. Migration is also debilitating: it 
deprives the country from which it comes of skills and 
initiative, especially since a substantial fraction of migrants 
settle overseas. The greater expertise and capital of the 
returning migrant may help local industrialisation, but on 
balance he may raise dependence on imports by spreading foreign 
consumption styles. He also acts as vector for foreign 
attitudes to work, political perceptions, etc, which may in 
various senses be locally inappropriate.^^
(1) Returning migrants often enter service occupations, e.g.
using their capital to buy shops, rather than manufacturing. 
For a full analysis of the social implications of migration 
and extensive references see(Bohning 19 ).
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Another way in which the cheapness of passenger transport 
makes employment and foreign exchange dependent on economic
-(in­activity and policies abroad is to open them to mass tourism.
This too has side effects on the local economy. Work in
hotels may attract labour from other sectors, especially
agriculture, thus affecting production. The policies of the
tourist sector, including employment practices, are - like its
organisation and architecture - in a degree based on foreign
models, since many of its establishments, especially the 
bigger hotels, are usually foreign-controlled. The pace and 
type of hotel construction are determined largely outside the 
country. And as with migration, not only is economic 
dependence increased directly, but also indirectly through 
cultural effects on consumption styles and political attitudes 
The life style of tourists reminds the natives of that of the 
core.
A country heavily dependent on migration and tourism finds 
other and more permanent constraints on its freedom of action, 
especially far-reaching political change. It cannot exercise 
effective control on the outflow of foreign exchange or the
inflow of foreign agents. Policy is also affected by fear 
of alarming or offending tourists or losing the goodwill of 
governments of countries receiving migrant workers. Economic 
activity is especially sensitive to fluctuations in 'confidence1, 
i.e. the extent to which foreign bankers, investors and traders
(2) I shall not go into the social costs of immigration or
tourism. Both disrupt local, in particular rural, culture, 
and both, especially immigration, damage family life.
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approve of the policies of the government concerned, which in 
turn reflects in part the way the media report those policies.
A decline in ’confidence* need not be due to the conscious 
decision of any government elsewhere to punish the country 
concerned: through thousands of private decisions, receipts
of foreign exchange are held up and payments expedited, 
suppliers' credit becomes more difficult to obtain, foreign 
investment falls, domestic capital is exported and banks 
withhold loans. So exchange reserves tend to fall,
leading to devaluation of the currency and import restrictions,
aggravating price rises, shortages and unemployment, and 
justifying and reinforcing the deterioration in confidence.
The political strains generated can then be used by forces 
inside and outside a government to press for the abandonment 
of social change. Deflationary policies are required by the 
IMP, as a condition of financial rescue.
Of course, any country can be affected by a decline in ’confidence1 
when its government adopts radical policies. But there are 
additional de-stabilising influences in countries dependent on 
migration and tourism. Emigrants withhold remittances and 
remain abroad; tourists stay away and retired people leave; 
hotel construction ceases. These responses are more rapid and 
greater than any decline in merchandise exports in a similar 
political situation, unless there is an international embargo.
In the long term, no doubt, these influences are weaker than 
the types of dependence on trade and investment which are more 
customarily studied, but in the short term, they can be a more 
powerful influence on policy.
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There are also non-economic consequences of proximity. One 
is military vulnerability. Although the general military 
importance of distance may have been declining in the long 
term as the loads and range of aircraft have increased, and 
as missiles have displaced them, limits to the possibility 
of invasion are still set by factors such as aircraft range 
and the time taken by aircraft carriers and other ships to 
reach a target area.
Military staffs are still very interested in whether hostile 
governments could establish bases in a neighbouring territory,
especially one with a common land frontier. This would greatly 
raise the cost of a given level of military security. It 
would diminish the warning time of the approach of bombers 
or missiles; and it would increase dangers of a surprise 
invasion, infiltration by guerillas or the illegal importation 
of arms. Even not being able to make military use of a 
neighbour’s territory may raise serious strategic problems. 
Economically powerful neighbours have therefore the incentive 
as well as the means to keep neighbours at least neutral.
They can also exert cultural pressures. If neighbouring countries 
do not actually share the same language, at least they are 
likely to belong to the same linguistic group (e.g. Latin-based) 
so that communication is easy. It is also frequent. Regular 
face-to-face contacts, work and social relations may be 
customary near a common frontier, especially if this cuts across 
an ethnic or linguistic group, with frequent inter-marriage.
In various professions (including politics), meetings and 
conferences with people from neighbouring countries are 
commonplace. In addition, telephone conversations between 
neighbours are inexpensive. Newspapers are cheaper and more 
up to date close to the printing works.
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Moreover, distance determines the effectiveness of radio 
broadcasts. There are limits of a few hundred kilometers 
to FM and medium-wave transmissions, the types normally 
received by domestic sets. The range is even less for 
television transmitters (though this depends very much on 
the terrain): there are also now often links between TV
systems of neighbouring countries. (It is true that foreign 
broadcasts can be 'jammed1 but if this is on an effective 
scale, it is costly and difficult to conceal.) Economic 
strength provides the resources for developing powerful and 
expansionist cultural 'industries'.
A small, relatively unindustrialised country on the 'periphery' 
of a system, the 'core' of which consists of countries 
technically more advanced, may therefore gain in the narrow 
sense that its income is likely to be higher than it would 
otherwise be, but at the cost of structural dependence; 
proximity brings subjection to economic, military and cultural 
hegemony.
Members of the periphery
The dependence of Portugal on European capital, tourism and
jobs for migrant workers, was illustrated by the 'revolution'
of April 1975. Dependence on foreign 'confidence' was shown
to be a brake on radical policies. Other countries of Southern
Europe are in much the same position. Malta and Greece are 
(the? militarily very weak, because of limited size - in both 
demographic and economic terms - and openness to invasion.
They are especially exposed to foreign cultural influences.
They lack advanced industries and therefore depend on foreign 
equipment and armaments. Similar points could be made about 
Spain and Yugoslavia, though in each of these the industrial 
structure is larger, better integrated and more autonomous.
As Table IX shows, however, even Spain's exports to West
Germany, a major trading partner, consist in large part of food
and raw materials, whereas she imports mostly manufactures and semis.
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The concepts of core and periphery do not only apply
internationally. Inside all countries there is in a sense
a national core, an area which is more dynamic economically
and exercises political and cultural sway over the more
backward areas, primarily rural auftgro. The national cohe
periphery receives internal migrants and provides much of the 
internal tourism. If a country is itself peripheral, this 
dualism is aggravated by the links which develop between the 
continental and national cores. Companies from core 
countries tend to establish their subsidiaries in the most 
developed areas, because of infrastructure, access to markets, 
etc. These subsidiaries may well displace small-scale 
industries of the national periphery.
Core governments tend to support conservative or centre 
governments in the periphery (and to try to stop radical change). 
The national core relays to the national periphery ideologies, 
tastes and fashions imported from abroad - most obviously when 
its transmitters send out imported television programmes, or 
its newspapers carry agency material. It can also act as a 
stage in the emigration process, with migrants coming to the 
national core and later proceeding (or releasing others to 
proceed) abroad.
It is of course well known that the countries of Southern 
Europe demonstrate problems of dualism, with some regions 
showing stable or declining employment and acute poverty, 
problems with both historical and international roots - see 
the maps. Salaried staff in modern industries, together 
with many in the bureaucracies, as well as self-employed 
professionals, enjoy living conditions comparable to those of 
their counterparts in the core (with the additional advantage 
of cheap domestic services). On the other hand, the rural 
population (the majority) live at quite different levels, as 
can be seen from data on water and electricity connections 
(Table I).
In housing qualities, as in their birth rates and life 
expectancy, however, their national averages are closer to 
those of the USA and the core centres of Europe than to even 
the more economically advanced countries of the ’Third World1 
(see Table II). On the other hand, their per capita income 
is distinctly nearer to the latter.
By the 1920s, Southern Europe had already fallen some way 
behind in economic and social terms. Social structures remained 
partially pre-industrial, and parliamentary institutions were 
weak and precarious. The area was the target for heavy political 
pressures from more powerful countries to the North, shown most 
conspicuously by Italo-German intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War and the subsequent German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece.
During the last two decades, all of these countries have 
become heavily dependent on migration and/or tourism to 
purchase the basic necessities without which their publics 
could not be employed, fed or defended. The annexe tables 
bring out the extent and significance of these phenomena.
The economic magnitudes are summarised in Table
TABLE A
Receipts from tourism and migration as proportions 
exports of goods and services, 1970
of total
«)
Tourism and 
Migration Tourism Migration
Portugal 12
Spain 39 30 8
Greece 36 13 23
Yugoslavia 26 9 17
Turkey 29 5 25
Source: Table VIII
(1) However, it should be borne in mind that there is a fairly high 
foreign exchange content to tourism, because of imported inputs 
(e.g. furnishings and even foodstuffs) and profit remittances.
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By 1970, in Greece and Spain, as in Portugal, the combined 
total of emigrants’ remittances and tourist expenditure was
comparable to the value of merchandise exports, ar 
equivalent to more than half of Yugoslavia’s exports.
It is true that, compared to most tropical countries, 
nationalism in Southern Europe has deeper cultural and 
political roots and (except for Yugoslavia and perhaps Spain), 
they enjoy greater ethnic and linguistic unity. They also 
have (especially Spain) more industrial and technological 
autonomy. But the nature of their relationship to bigger 
and more industrialised neighbours is such that they too can 
be considered dependent countries.
There are two other somewhat similar cases to the west and 
north of Europe respectively: the Republic of Ireland, and
Finland. Judging from housing quality and demographic data 
they are quite comparable (Tables I and II). They are also 
each dependent on^ one neighbour closer to the continental 
landmass, Britain and Sweden respectively, by which they were 
for centuries ruled, and which provided landowning 
aristocracies, remnants of which still remain. Both countries 
obtain from their big neighbours not merely the usual imports 
of equipment and technology, but also jobs and tourists 
(though tourism in Ireland has been affected by political 
troubles), and in addition they both demonstrate dualism 
(e.g. in housing quality) and cultural (including linguistic) 
dependence. However, in most respects, Ireland is less 
autonomous - for example, Finland has become a net spender on 
tourist account (Table IV), as well as having a higher per 
capita income (Table II). Ireland’s exports are mainly 
primary products (especially livestock products) and they go 
largely to Britain, whereas Finland’s are more diversified in 
both commodity and destination (Table IX).
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There are other countries, neither geographically nor culturally 
strictly part of Europe, but showing the same pattern, 
depending on it for tourism and migration, as well as trade 
and technology, because of the cheapness of fares over what are
still relatively short distances. I refer to Turkey, Cyprus,
. (1) xumsia, Algeria and Morocco. These countries can be
considered an outer periphery. It is true that they are
less accessible to either military invasion or propaganda,
and that Islamic culture and non-European languages protect
them in some degree from foreign influences on patterns of
consumption and on attitudes and perceptions. But they rely 
more heavily than Spain does on trading primary products for 
manufactures (see Table IV for Turkey’s trade with West Germany). 
There is in each of them a modern sector where foreign economic 
and cultural influences, including the use of French or English 
are common and social conditions much better than in the 
hinterland. Social and economic indicators (Tables I and II) 
suggest that they have characteristics in common with some 
countries of Latin America.
Members of the core
There are two ’cores' to the European periphery - in the sense 
of suppliers of capital and technology; centres of political, 
military and cultural dominance; providers of tourists and 
absorbers of migration. These are the United States and 
Central Europe. Although the latter is itself partly 
dependent on the former, in recent decades it has become in 
most of these dimensions (except the military) the more
(1) Senegal and the Ivory Coast also depend on European
employment and tourism, though to a much lesser extent. 
Libya would no doubt belong to the group of North African 
dependencies but for its oil.
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important in relation to the European periphery. I shall 
concentrate on it in this essay which is about the European 
system, but we should not forget the United States connection.
West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland,^^ 
Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden provide most of the tourists^ 
and nearly all the jobs for migrants. They tend to draw workers 
from nearby countries - France from Portugal, Spain and Algeria; 
West Germany from the Balkans and Turkey; both from Italy (see 
Table V). Tourism shows the same pattern (Table III). They 
are also major exporters of capital, technology and equipment, 
and of cultural artefacts (films, television programmes, 
newspapers, magazines, etc).
Culturally, the core is fairly homogeneous, sharing similar life 
styles, especially cars and household durables. Much the same 
consumer brands and architectural fashions can be found every­
where. A parachutist landing among the concrete blocks of an 
urban area in the core would probably take some time to 
recognise which city it was. There is a dense network of 
motorways, and the horse is used only for sport.
Social and economic indicators (Tables I and II) suggest social 
conditions like those of the USA. In none of these countries 
is there exchange control; they have single exchange rates which 
have appreciated against all other currencies (except the yen) 
since the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971.
These countries also show regional inequalities - for example 
Brittany and Corsica are somewhat less developed in most respects
(1) Switzerland is a net recipient of tourists, as is Austria, 
but it is the banking centre of the core.
(2) There are also significant tourist expenditures by peripheral 
countries (see Table IV), mostly in the core. This however 
is qualitatively and quantitatively different: it is not mass 
tourism, but tourism of the elite.
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than Alsace-Lorraine or the Paris region. But the contrasts 
are mild in comparison with what they are in the periphery.
An interesting question is how one should classify Italy.
It suffers from a well-known dualism between the North on the
one hand and, on the other, the South, Sicily and Sardinia.
The development of transportation and mass communications has
brought these areas increasingly under the economic, political
ana cultural influence of the North, one symptom being the
heavy migration of labour northwards (the resulting remittances
covering their trade deficit - and very possibly an outflow of 
private capital too).^^ Social conditions are on the whole 
worse than in most members of the core as Tables I and II show: 
per capita income and birth rates are closer to those of Greece. 
And foreign bankers’ ’confidence’ is by no means unimportant to 
Italian governments. This country also depends on tourism 
and is a net supplier of migrant labour to the core.
But in Italy these activities are less important to the balance 
of payments than in the other countries of Southern Europe.
A much smaller proportion of its industrial structure is 
foreign-controlled, and it is a substantial manufacturer of 
equipment, steel, chemicals, etc. Its trade unions have 
reduced the gap between wages in the North and elsewhere, and 
have put pressure on public corporations (e.g. Alfa-Romeo) to 
locate new factories in the South. There are bodies (such as 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) with special responsibilities for 
the underdeveloped regions. So social conditions are much 
better in Southern Italy than (say) Southern Portugal. Moreover, 
it is not intuitively obvious that Italy is as dependent in other
(l) A dependent region cannot of course apply trade or exchange 
controls against other parts of the same country.
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economic respects, or in the cultural and political dimensions.
A question mark also hangs over the classification of Britain. 
This is a country increasingly penetrated by foreign capital 
which has gained a big fraction of North Sea oil concessions, 
and foreign goods, which have captured a large share of primary - 
domestic markets. While Britain has been an importer of labour 
from the Caribbean and South Asia, as well as the Irish 
Republic and (though on a smaller scale) Southern Europe, it 
has been an exporter to the United States and the 'old* 
Commonwealth. In the last few years immigration has dried 
up, making it on balance a marginal exporter. It is also now 
a net receiver of tourists (see Table IV). Social conditions 
in Scotland, Wales and the South West are worse than in most 
core countries. There are areas which live partly off tourism 
and suffer from above-average unemployment and partial 
depopulation. (From 1951 to 1975, the net emigration from 
Scotland was 666 thousand, an annual average of 28 thousand, 
or rather over of the population: about half have gone
overseas, half to the rest of the United Kingdom, predominantly 
Southern England.) But, even more than in Italy, the fiscal 
system is powerful enough (as in the countries of the core) to 
prevent great social contrasts emerging between the richer 
areas of England and the peripheral areas (see Tables I and II). 
Its average social conditions are not noticeably different from 
those of a core country (despite a distinctly lower average 
income).
However, Britain and Italy are both rather weak technologically
fa&TZt&JLcompared to other members of the core^STTcl Tt is interesting 
that they both have shown more clearly than the remainder of 
the EEC (with the exception of the Republic of Ireland) the 
characteristic symptoms of 1under-development* - inflation 
and foreign exchange problems - especially since the shock of 
the price rises in 1973-74 in oil and other commodities (see
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Table C). Of the two, Ital-y is more similar to a country 
of the pori^phe r^y . J c ** ^
The spatial pattern
Map A shows the countries of the core and the periphery.
The core countries are not only so in the sense of being the 
centres of economic, political and cultural power, but also in 
a strictly geographical sense. Broadly speaking, they lie at 
the spatial centre, whereas the 'peripheral* and 'semi- 
peripheral' countr;e|s (among which we can include Finland) jut 
out into the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Arctic.
Norway is—in tfaiszzrc-spcct apparently unhik-e oth^-r--memb&r^_n£ 
(£he^~cor^ >.»v^ /vBufc 4t has only recently joined ancf^anyway^
it is effectively a North Sea country, only a small fraction 
of the population living on the Atlantic coast (small enough 
to be supported by the remainder, especially since the 
exploitation of North Sea oil started).
An even clearer pattern stands out if we ignore national 
boundaries. In countries on the edge of the core, broadly 
those (furthest from it are economically the least dynamic, 
with heavy unemployment and depopulation (see Maps B and C).
If we go round the rim of the core clockwise starting with 
Yugoslavia, the most dynamic area is the North West, Slovenia; 
in Italy, the North; in Spain, Catalonia and the Basque 
provinces which lie to the North and North-East; in Britain, 
the South-East; in Finland, the South-West.
The pattern is brought out strikingly by Map B. The core areas 
form an incomplete oval, with its centre just north of Kassel 
in West Germany. (The missing segment is Eastern Europe 
which I shall discuss later.) The length of the longest axis
is 3,000 TtD^ and its breadth rather less than 1,500. Such a 
strong pattern could hardly arise from a purely random process,
Table B
Civiljrarr R & D expenditure per capita in the EEC, 1976 
(European units of account) 
y&are
Belgium 40
Denmark 38
France 40
Netherlands 40
West Germany 58
Britain* 21
Italy 9
-------
y
Ireland 10
Source:
y lz  ju A u u d u , f
4f*nL/ F V* Britain h«£r, however, spent^dnore per capita on military
R & D than any other member of EEC, far more than-any-
except France.
Table C
-Qhangfe&-«4Ti Retail prices and exchange rates in the EEC, 1970, 1973 and 1976
Retail prices ^ f V c J  Exchange rate*
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Netherlands 
West Germany
Britain
Italy
'—
Ireland
1970 1973 1976+ 1970 1973 1976i
100 118 161 100 97 97
100 123 167 100 101 101
100 120 162 100 100 103
100 126 161 100 96 93
100 119 140 100 91 88
100 128 206 100 123 153
100 123 189 100 117 163
100 132 206 100 123 153
Source: Public Expenditure on Research and Development 1974-76
(EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1976)
* Local currency units Europ ean unit of account.
+ Preliminary.
*
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and it is mute evidence of the influence of proximity.
C, rU *J> c y  C h + ^ -e-^  ,  .  -  -
Of course, too much attention should not be paid to the exact 
path of the boundary. Cities like Aberdeen and Rome are 
comparable to some that are inside the oval, which, on the
other hand, Ln&44idcc several slums.
# # .of migrants from the periphery./
Broadly speaking, those living inside the oval are less 
likely to be working in agriculture or tourism, to be 
unemployed, to see their families broken by migration, or to 
receive a very low income, than those outside. Nearly all 
the big European transnational companies (including banks) 
have their headquarters inside, as well as most of the 
television studios, newspaper offices, book publishers, etc.
And generally, the closer to the centre of the oval, the greater 
the concentration of power. One could imagine an inner oval, 
which would include Denmark, West Germany, the Benelux 
countries, Paris, the Lyon area, Switzerland and Lombardy.
Outside the oval shown on the map, the pattern still broadly
holds. In Ireland, the east coast is the more dynamic; in(2)Turkey, the western provinces. The picture is less clear
(1) If distance were all-important, one might expect a circle 
rather than an oval. Indeed the precise shape is a 
matter of personal judgement - one could easily broaden 
the oval into a circle by extending it to cover the whole 
of the British Isles to the North-West and almost the 
whole of Italy to the South-East. This would produce 
anomalies, however. Ireland, the Highlands and islands
of Scotland and central Wales hardly seem to be core areas; 
nor does Sardinia or Southern Italy (or parts of Albania).
I am unable to rationalise the oval shape.
(2) In Turkey, the population per physician was less than 800 
in the European provinces, including Istanbul; more than 
10,000 in the group of provinces on the eastern border 
(Turkey, 1972).
(These consist, however,
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in Greece and Portugal, perhaps because people and goods 
mostly move to the core by sea and air through Athens and 
Lisbon respectively (rather than overland via northern 
frontiers). But here too many of the poorest regions lie 
to the South, or in islands off to the South-East and 
South-West respectively. The same pattern also can be found 
further afield: the poorest and most dependent areas in
North Africa are those nearest the Sahara.
In fact, as a generalisation the further from the core a place 
is, the poorer it is likely to be,^^ the more dependent 
technologically and more likely to be catering for tourists 
and sending workers towards the core. It may, however, still 
preserve more political and cultural autonomy than areas 
closer in. This pattern is so marked that we can describe 
it as systemic.
The possibility of describing this European system in spatial 
terms raises the question: 'Do countries matter?1 However,
for many purposes - e.g. in discussing future membership of 
the EEC - it is necessary to conduct analysis at the national 
level. The nation-state remains a major factor, especially 
in rich countries with a considerable measure of homogeneity.
In fact the European system can be analysed in both spatial 
and national terms, and they are not by any means mutually 
exclusive.
Eastern Europe
The oval in the metaphor of the European system is incomplete 
(see Map B again). What about the countries to the East of
(1) A regression diagram shows that the income per head in
provinces of the original six EEC members tends to be lower 
the further a province is from Dusseldorf (which is close to 
the centre of the oval) witn a fairly high degree of 
correlation (Weltwirtschaft, 1972).
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West Germany? Can one see a somewhat analogous system?
The economically most powerful is East Germany, which lies 
in fact very close to the West European core. Not only 
does it export equipment and technology, as is typical for a 
core country; it employs migrant labour (though not in great 
quantities) from countries further east and is a net exporter 
of tourists to them. Its social conditions and average 
income are not much inferior to those of West Germany, at 
about the Austrian level (see Tables I and II). J)"~As within 
the West European system, broadly the further from Germany, the 
worse the social conditions of an East European country.
The tables show strikingly that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland can be considered (like Britain, Finland and Italy) 
intermediate between core and periphery, though the social 
conditions and income levels in Hungary and Poland are more 
similar to those of the periphery of Western Europe. The same 
geographical pattern can be seen, with the western regions 
more highly developed than those further east - i.e. further 
from the German core. One could in fact complete the oval 
of Map B, which would bring into the core Bohemia, Silesia 
and what was formerly East Prussia, as well as Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania.
Bulgaria and Romania are more clearly peripheral in economic
structure, income levels and social conditions, as well as
being more dependent on imported technology (mainly from East
x ( 1 )Germany and the Soviet Union), though able to show roe^ e 
cultural and political independence (especially Romania).
(1) Albania shows figures comparable to a moderately prosperous 
Latin American country of about the same size, such as 
Costa Rica. However, it is not structurally a member of 
the East European periphery.
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So one can again see a system. Of course it is also part 
of the periphery of R u s s i a . T h i s  stands in somewhat the 
same relation to Eastern Europe as the United States does to 
Western Europe. The military and economic links are strong 
( through the Warsaw Pact and COMECON) Russia expe^t^s 
energy and technology, notably arms and agricultural equipment, 
but sends relatively few tourists and accepts very few migrants. 
But its cultural influence is weak - indeed the more developed 
countries of Eastern Europe show clear signs of US cultural 
influences. Its income levels and consumer technology are 
inferior to those of the United States. So it is not fully 
able to act as a major core, though its population size alone, 
together with its resource base, enable it still to exert a 
dominant influence in Eastern Europe.
Long-term trends
A core-periphery system is of course no novelty in Europe,
though earlier systems had different types of linkage and not
always geographically the same core. For several centuries,
the centre was somewhat similar to today, consisting of France,(2)Austria and what were at the time German principalities.
But then the pattern started to change in the sixteenth 
century. Spain and Portugal, later Britain, France and the 
Netherlands, became increasingly important as the various overseas 
empires were formed and the centre of gravity of Europe was 
displaced to the Atlantic coast. It returned to the European 
heartland in the last two decades with the growing industrial 
leadership of Germany, the collapse of the colonial empires 
and the contraction of European influence overseas.
(1) Whieh "extends eastwards to the Pacific, encompassing the 
former Tsarist colonies.
(2) The Empire of Charlemagne covered more or less the central 
area of today's core. There were also semi-peripheral 
areas of some economic strength in Scandinavia.
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The precursor of the present system was Continental Europe in 
1939-45. The German government and its corporations 
harnessed the occupied and allied countries to the German war 
economy. Labour was imported from them on a large scale:
German armed forces also lived in them rather like tourists, 
making use of hotels.
This system collapsed with the defeat of Germany, but something 
formally similar reappeared in the 1960s, with the revival of 
industrial output and a new phase of technological advance.
The proximate causes of the recent explosion of migration and 
tourism have been a number of simultaneous trends. The core's 
fast growth had its origins in national efforts, with US aid, 
to make good wartime destruction (in what was in fact the 
cockpit of the war). This growth then became self-sustaining, 
with the pace of advance itself creating capital investment 
needs and also the resources for financing R and D expenditures 
and advertising campaigns, which stimulated further needs for 
investment and consumption.
In the quarter-century 1948-73, not merely did the core economies 
of Western Europe grow at more than 5% a year, raising both 
wage rates and the demand for labour: the natural growth of
their population of working age was only about %%, so they were 
able not only to absorb their own labour reserves (and a 
considerable number of refugees from Eastern Europe), but also 
needed much foreign labour. In addition, while wage rates 
were rising, fares remained stable or fell, due to technical 
progress in both airplane design (including size) and ticket 
m a r k e t i n g . ' C h a r t e r  inclusive tours' became especially
(1) Scheduled air fares fell (absolutely, not merely relatively) 
from 1950 to 1968 for nearly all journeys (Peters, 19 ).
Indeed as late as 1973, they were still generally below 1950 
levels.
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cheap and their volume rose many times. The very influx of
increased investment requirements for housing and other social 
infrastructure.
Within the core, this cumulative economic expansion since the 
war, together with strong fiscal systems, has brought a great 
improvement in social conditions. Virtually the whole 
population of the core has incomes of over $1,000 per capita, 
i.e. well in the top half of the world income distribution.
The very rise in the consumption of the dense population of
the core has in various ways stimulate  ;m. The
formidable pollution has partia-Lly d-es-t-royed the natural 
environment of the core. Secondly, the cost of services 
has become very high. Thirdly, the modernisation of the 
cities of the core has partially destroyed their character, 
making the cities of the periphery more interesting.
Moreover, the rising expectations of the labour force of the 
core, not only with respect to wages but also working 
conditions and job security, made employers interested in 
immigrant labour. European movements of tourists and labour 
accelerated to greater total volumes than ever before.
(1) In the 19th century, of course, the industrialisation of 
Britain was accompanied not by immigration but ^emigration 
on a large scale. The basic reasons were that the 
industrial and agricultural revolutions displaced many 
artisans, tenant farmers and smallholders, but the labour 
needs of industrial expansion were relatively small.
(as has been confirmed by recent experience in many other 
countries, industrial growth is usually matched by an 
almost comparable growth in productivity, and unless the 
industrial sector is large, little impact is made on the 
employment needs of a population growing at 2% to 3°/Q a 
year.) Moreover, there were still 'empty' colonies 
overseas then, so a British citizen could expect to raise 
his income by emigration, -whiAr-would no.t be true-to4ay--nf 
many- uibT-z^ h-s of— ' cor-e-'— eoun-tries.__
foreign workers (especially those accompanied by families)
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In both France and West Germany, migrant labour in the 1970s 
has accounted for more than 10% of the number of employed.
This helped stimulate expansion in the periphery.
So in a sense, this system worked - until 1973. There seemed 
to be no shortage of metals and energy to hinder its continued 
expansion. Nor were the environmental costs widely perceived. 
However, the resource problem has become increasingly apparent^ 
with a fundamental decline in the bargaining strength of 
European countri-es, especially due to their dependence on 
imported oil, and pollution controls have also been increasing. 
The secular rate of economic growth could well be slow hence­
forward, even after the recovery from the recession that 
started in 1974. Attempts to accelerate to the previous pace 
might generate inflation at rates politically intolerable, 
especially in West Germany.
In addition, the post-war decline in passenger fares relative 
to wages was temporarily reversed, following the sharp 
increase in fuel costs, and the tourist boom has faltered.
Moreover, the recruitment of foreign workers has become both 
less necessary and dearer to organise. Immigration is being 
resisted more strongly by trade unions. The social infra­
structure needed by immigrants is appearing expensive to 
governments which find financial resources chronically 
inadequate, especially since migrant labour is obtaining more 
’rights', includingH5eing joined by their families.
(1) The phenomena are also linked. The migrant labour require­
ments of internal tourism in the core is especially high.
18% of the employees in West German hotels and restaurants 
in 1972 were migrants (OECD, 19 ).
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Recipient governments had in fact already, before the oil 
crisis, taken steps to check immigration, such as the 
Franco-Portuguese protocole of 1971 which limited migration 
to 65,000 a year, but guaranteed these better welfare and 
training facilities. In 1972, regulation of immigrant workers 
in France was tightened and the Gastarbeiterstop was announced 
in West Germany in 1973.
The effects of these measures were reinforced by the recent
recession, which caused many migrant workers (often the most
vulnerable) to lose their jobs,^1  ^ and led to further migration
controls. In 1974, a ’temporary l»ltf was announced in France
C~ £ a.uto all immigration (and counfryles to operate, with exceptions
for badly-needed workers), and in 1977, unemployed workers on
public assistance were offered F 10,000 (with extra payments
for dependants in the labour force) if they gave up rights to
social benefits and left France. In Switzerland, a policy of
reducing the immigrant labour force was adopted in 1975, following
a referendum. V~Table V shows the dramatic decline in the rates
of immigration between 1970 and 1975,Xthough less so in the
case of Italians who could not be excludecy5. Several countries
of the periphery have experienced a net immigration of labour.(2)Migration on the old scale is unlikely to be resumed, 
especially in view of the long-term weakness of the labour- 
intensive industries in which migrants tend to congregate
(1) In France, unemployed migrants receiving public assistance 
rose from 34,000 in 1973 to over 100,000 in 1977 (Le Monde, 
1977; Scharffenberger, 1977). This would amount to about 
5%, but the author points out that fewer than half of 
unemployed migrant workers are eligible for public assistance.
(2) See (Bohning, 1976). Bohning estimates that, between 1973 
and 1976, employment of migrants in the original six members 
of the EEC (excluding Italy), plus Austria, Denmark and 
Switzerland, fell by 1.3 million, or nearly 25%. It is 
expected to decline slowly henceforward.
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(Hiemenz and Schatz, 1976 and 1977).
However, the stock of migrant workers in the core has not 
fallen greatly - thus in 1975 it was still at or above the 
1970 level (Table VI). iirs economies have become partly 
dependent on them, especially to do jobs which few native 
workers would take on. So emigrant remittances have 
remained at a high level, though they have been affected by 
the growing tendency for family dependants to join migrant 
workers.
The relevance of development studies
Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate that core-periphery 
analysis yields insights into the problems which now face 
Europe with the slowing down of growth and the collapse of 
the previous system.
Whether the peripheral countries of this continent can usefully 
be called ’developing' is a moot point. In terms of per 
capita income, or even the extent and nature of poverty, they 
are clearly far distant from, say, Bangladesh (though not 
from Argentina).^^ Their fiscal systems are capable of 
providing more or less comprehensive welfare services, even 
if the volume of job opportunities is not adequate. Their 
economic structures are more diversified and their 
administrative systems arguably less incompetent. They have 
cultures rooted in long national histories without significant 
foreign settlement, importation of slaves, etc - in contrast
(l) It is however not really possible - although people do so - 
to estimate per capita incomes in most of Africa or Asia, 
because of the lack of data on many types of rural income in 
such countries, especially from non-agricultural activities. 
(Seers and Lipton, 1977). Moreover, exchange rates are 
inappropriate deflators because of the lack of information on 
non-tradables such as services and rent, which are relatively 
dear in Europe. So published data convey a very exaggerated 
impression of the gap between incomes in the 'Third World' 
and those in Southern Europe.
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to Africa and Latin America, especially. But in terms of 
technology and political power, they are clearly qualitatively 
different from the United States - or from Japan or West 
Germany.
However, ’developing countries’ is hardly a useful category 
now, anyway. A more relevant question is whether the body 
of theory on development is more relevant to European countries, 
especially in the periphery, than conventional social science 
theory (e.g. naive forms of neo-classical economics) developed 
in and for dominant countries, taking for granted their 
structural characteristics and interest in free trade. The 
above analysis suggests that this is the c a s e . D e v e l o p m e n t  
studies can provide a refreshment of the European social 
sciences.
We can also expect the rich experience of governments of Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, especially Latin America, to be
relevant to the crisis the periphery now faces. One
conclusion which can be drawn from this experience is that 
economic growth per se may do little to relieve social problems,
which it can in fact aggravate. The criterion for judging
policy is not therefore whether it will accelerate growth, 
but rather structural change, especially reduction of regional 
inequalities.
Another lesson is that nationalism is, on the whole, a 
constructive force for dependent countries, indeed necessary 
for the preservation of a degree of economic, political and 
cultural autonomy (not necessarily autarchy). Some governments 
have learned to use, in political negotiations, whatever 
bargaining instruments are available and to be selective in
(1) See (IDS Communication 121, 1977) for a case study, which 
includes a discussion of what one means by ’development 
theory’.
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welcoming foreign capital and technology, as Japan did in the 
period 1900-60. The government of Venezuela has been more 
successful than that of Britain in getting a grip on the pace 
and pattern of oil development.^^
Perhaps the national interests of members of the periphery lie, 
on many issues, especially vis a vis the transnational 
corporations, rather with ’Group of 77’, than with the core 
of Europe. If their delegations nearly always vote with the 
latter (in Group B at UNCTAD, for example), this must be 
attributed partly to a cultural lag and partly perhaps to 
feelings of ethnic solidarity. (The analogy at the national 
level is the reluctance of many professional associations in 
Britain and other ’developed’ countries to join trade union 
federations - a reluctance which has gradually disappeared as 
the distinction between manual and non-manual workers has 
partially lost its significance in terms of both income and 
political power.)
The field of development studies carries also implications 
for future national strategy in dealing with the TNCs. This 
may raise important issues in the European periphery. Instead 
of labour moving to where capital is available, capital may 
increasingly flow to where labour is less organised and less
(2)dear (especially when fringe benefits are taken into account). 
Often parts of a manufacturing process can be carried out 
abroad, reducing congestion and pollution in the core. This 
provides the receiving country with the foreign exchange to 
import from the core more skill- and capital-intensive products. 
The trade unions of the core can and do oppose the immigration 
of labour: they cannot stop the emigration of capital.
(1) (IDS Communication 121, 1977) Chapters IV and V.
(2) The large potential for this is estimated in (Hiemenz and 
Schatz, 1976) Vol II.
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The European periphery offers an export base that may appear 
to corporations better than one further afield. Although 
wages are higher, the labour force is more highly skilled.
And while this area is politically less stable than the 
core, it may well appear to core manufacturers safer than 
much of the rest of the world.
So a new European system could emerge with workers of the 
periphery continuing to be recruited by the same transnational 
corporations, but in their own countries. At first sight, 
foreign investment seems not only to involve lower social 
costs than migration, in terms of disruption to local culture 
and family life, but also to be more effective in modernising 
the periphery. It brings technology as well as adding to 
the stock of capital, providing foreign exchange earnings 
and raising income and taxable capacity. It may well 
accelerate economic growth.
However, experience elsewhere throws doubt on these advantages. 
The reasons can only be summarised here. The contribution to
the periphery’s capital investment is much less than it
appears to be, because much of the direct cost of a project 
is usually covered by local private capital (e.g. through 
bank loans), and the government has to provide much of the 
infrastructure. Moreover, the contribution to technology is 
also doubtful: research facilities typically remain in the
core, and production would hardly continue to be competitive 
in overseas markets without the continued injection of 
innovations devised outside the country. Besides, the 
technology may be too capital-intensive for the needs of the 
periphery - a familiar problem for ’developing’ countries.
The gain to the balance of payments may be limited: while the
worker would be spending his wages largely in his own country,
these may well be less than he would have remitted home as a 
migrant worker (and one should also allow for the import content
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of his consumption, especially in a food-importing country).
The addition to taxable capacity may also be illusory, 
because of fiscal concessions and inadequate administration, 
especially in handling 'transfer pricing1.
The government of a peripheral country also loses some of 
its control of its own economy. It has to rely on the 
companies concerned for marketing the output. The destination 
of their exports (like the origin of their imports) is therefore 
partially outside state influence: so are their levels of 
investment, output and employment. And since a threat to
foreign companies would become a threat to the jobs of their 
local employees, trade union officials would lobby ministers 
on their behalf. Foreign capital also often reinforces 
internal dualism, flowing into cities, especially ports, 
rather than into the rural areas where it is most needed.
Internal migration is then stimulated.
In any case, the employment provided by foreign firms is hardly 
likely to make as significant an impact on local labour markets 
as international migration did in the 19^0s, especially since 
capital movements are also highly sensitive to political changes. 
Yet the population of working age in the periphery continues to 
increase steadily. So^ foreign investment may not avert the 
appearance of heavy and chronic unemployment and other social 
problems in the periphery. The tendency of the peripheral 
countries, and peripheral areas within them, to become more 
dependent would continue.
There is no space here to analyse the political developments in 
other continents but the combination of dualism and heavy 
unemployment has contributed to the spread of authoritarian
regimes, especially in South 
{ X lL  6 f - t + A s f A t v 7
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The attempt to make do without TNC investment would also 
involve problems. There are questions about the ability 
of any conceivable bureaucracy to carry out radical development 
strategies, about the strength of internal support for them,
ru'A,iSabout the feasibility of -o-frhur sources of external support 
-Xxom olscwhe-ro- (e. g. the Soviet Union) and about the 
willingness of core governments to tolerate such a development.
Enlargement of the EEC?
There is another possible solution: membership of the European
Economic Community. Formal applications by the governments 
of Greece, Portugal and Spain are being considered. This 
would guarantee the right of migration into recipient 
countries (no doubt after a transitional period) as well as 
providing a degree of political support for the status quo, 
and opening up new sources of official and private capital.
It is therefore likely to be favoured by capitalist and 
workers who are linked with TNCs and by the professional 
class, including the state bureaucracy.^^
However, against greater access to the markets of the core 
must be set the further opening up of their own markets to 
competition that would destroy many small businesses. It 
would be (eventually) impossible to close national markets 
again by tariffs, import quotas or exchange controls (or 
perhaps, in the end, by devaluation). This obligation is 
potentially costly for countries with chronic payments 
problems - it has weighed heavily on the quasi-peripheral 
members, Italy and Britain. In Portugal, which in this 
respect is not atypical of the group, a large fraction of 
the manufacturing labour force (notably in textiles and
(l) Similar alignments could be seen in discussions about 
regional integration in Latin America - and also in the 
British debate about applying to enter the EEC.
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clothing) is employed in small firms which could hardly face 
the full competitive power of the giant corporations of the 
core, despite the difference in wage levels. EEC membership 
might lock a country like this into dependence on exporting 
labour. Moreover, it would involve increased reliance on 
European TNCs, with the associated problems previously 
discussed. Foreign political and cultural penetration^^ 
would increase^mainly into the national cores, reinforcing dualism.
Further polarisation of Europe could in principle be mitigated
by a European Fiscal System - just as national dualism is
restrained by redistributive taxation. In the EEC, however,
fiscal arrangements are very weak and far from egalitarian.
Expenditure by all Community Institutions in 1977 was 0.7% of the
aggregate gross produce of EEC members, or less than 2% of the
total public expenditures (EEC 1977). The effect was only
about 1% of what would be needed to eliminate regional and
( 2)state disparities. Its one clearly peripheral member,
Ireland, does not seem to have benefitted greatly from 
m e m b e r s h i p . N o r  has Southern I t a l y . A  successful
(1) On the other hand, some regional separatists consider 
European integration ate a way of preserving local culture 
from national domination, and a nationalist, especially in 
a core country, might consider it a form of protection from 
domination by the United States tif-or the Soviet Union.
(2) (EEC 1977) Vol II, Chapter 14. This is because the bulk of 
expenditure is agricultural (not social or regional) with 
benefits mainly for relatively rich members (Belgium, Denmark 
and the Netherlands). One poor country (Ireland) has also 
gained, but there is only a very limited impact on the other 
countries needing aid (Britain and Italy). The loan operations 
(mainly through the European Investment Bank) have little 
grant element and small redistributive effect.
(3) Unemployment there has grown to more than 10% of the labour 
force. This is partly due to the recession, of course, and 
to a decline in 'confidence1 affecting tourism.
(4) Robert Wade points out that capital grants to Southern 
farmers have been small; there has been no intervention to 
change the structure of land ownership; and price supports 
are of little help (IDS Discussion Paper 106, 1977)
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enlargement would involve at least much bigger resources for 
the Regional Fund, the Social Fund and the European Investment 
Bank (and lending policies by the Bank that took more account 
of social needs), but perhaps more fundamental fiscal arrangements 
to institutionalise the transfer of incomes from the richer 
areas of the Community to the poorer.
It would require a transformation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (which, in the view of many, is needed anyway) so as to 
enable French and Italian farmers to move out of products - such 
as wine - in which the new candidates for membership have 
considerable productive capacity. It would necessitate 
structural changes in the manufacturing sectors of the core to 
accommodate supplies of steel (from Spain), of textiles (from
V
^upp3 iiffls-of steel (from. ffEom^all three) etc.
And it would necessitate enlarged capacity in equipment industries 
in the area to meet the consequential investment needs in both 
the existing nine and the three. In brief, what would be involved 
would be not merely a shift away from the EEC's laissez-faire 
ideology, but the creation of a new European system to replace one 
that had floundered and anyway has ceased to operate. This means 
a European Development Plan covering adrevo the restructuring of all 
economies* Otherwise, indeed, labour migration, which would be 
both permitted and stimulated by the enlargement, would be on 
a scale very hard for the core to accommodate: more important,
While the economic and political costs of this adjustment wouJ^^i
would not be unmanageable. feo-roa&onc are
labour and capital in the core. Moreover, capital could be directed 
to this task. Transfers amounting to $30 billion a year, or 2% of
Much flows from Europe, to Africa, Asia and Latin America in the
form of aid programmes (about $6 billion in 1977) as well as
private investment. Indeed policy in these respects might switch
its emphasis to the periphery. Aid has been stimulated in part
by humanitarian motives, including guilt feelings over colonial
exploitation: indeed in Britain and France, especially, its
geographical pattern suggests a lingering colonial influence.
But the resources for continuing to play this role are more
difficult to extract from economies which are strained by internal
demands, (especially for investment in new sources of energy).
So the justification for aid has increasingly stressed the importance
to the core of long-term world economic progress and therefore
the tendency of Europe to would continue.
to provide employment for the unemployed
the GDP of the enlarged community would
political stability. This line of argument would, however, 
point to a greater priority for using the limited available 
resources on the ramparts of Europe itself. The total population 
of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland (51 millions in 1970) 
is about the same as that of France, or one-sixth of the total 
enlarged EEC. So the cost of, in effect, conv
A further enlargement of the EEC would mean a profound change in 
its nature. At present, it is essentially a core organisation, 
dominated by West Germany, France and Britain, small enough 
for an eventual federation to be conceivable. The addition of 
Portugal, Spain and Greece - and perhaps eventually Cyprus and 
Turkey - would make it less closely-knit and increase the number 
of governments with strong interests in correcting continental 
imbalances.
An immensely important choice is emerging for the core governments 
of Europe. The possible continental rationalisation of industrial 
and agricultural production, and the stability of an enlarged EEC 
would be attractive for core business. A policy of 'collective 
self-reliance' would reduce dependence on the United States and 
other outside powers, and the risk of Europe being drawn into war 
would be lessened. However, the necessary redistribution of 
income would be resisted as would the removal of immigration 
controls, especially if the rate of growth of the core did not pick 
up.
Yet if EEC does not open its doors and reform itself, the pressures 
in the periphery could lead to the emergence of highly nationalist 
governments. The same interaction of declining 'confidence' and 
economic activity that no r mallv discourages radical policies could
welfare states into a welfare continent would
(£9) The demographic balance in Europe between core and
countries is very different from that of the world as a whole.
nproduce the opposite effect in some circumstances. It is t n e  
that the resultant governments may well stress social reform 
rather than revolution and national interest rather than 
international proletarian solidarity (i.e. be 'Eurocommunist') 
but they might nonetheless involve a partial detachment from 
the European system and perhaps political links with the Soviet
( 3QJ (/Union. '^'Conceivably, one or two political shocks of this
kind to the governments of the core countries could help bring
about the consolidation of the remaining countries in a reformed WcX
E££k Where would the expansion of the EEC stop.
Cyprus and Turkey would be obvious candidates. Eastern Europe
might also be co-opted in time. There are already signs of
its penetration by West German TNCs, especially through joint 
7I
ventures, and also by West German tourists. Many East
Europeans, especially Poles, work in West Germany as temporary 
migrants.
A further shift eastwards in the core in the future is not 
inconceivable, involving the consolidation of Europe as a whole, 
with the Rhine-Ruhr at its heart, under the leadership of an 
economically reunited Germany - i.e. the peaceful achievement 
of the German government's political and economic aims in the 
1939-45 war, the 'new order in Europe'.
' / (*^ €0 The resultant strains may make political repression
unavoidable, whatever the motives of the political leadership.
Michael Shanks cites as sone of the reasons why the 
reunification of West and East Germany was becoming a 
possibility that "at considerable cost, West German 
industry has bought its way back into the traditional 
economic hinterland of Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Anybody who has travelled recently in these countries 
can testify to the extent to which German businessmen 
have seized the opportunity." (The Times, 9.8.76).
But the complete integration of Europe would put greater strain 
on the fiscal resources of the core, and could hardly take place 
until after Southern Europe had been digested. It is also likely 
to be inhibited by the dependence of Eastern and Western Europe 
on the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. 
Institutions such as the Warsaw Pact and NATO are not easily 
eliminated - they become centres of political power in their 
own right. The Soviet government, in particular, would perceive 
such a development as a serious threat.
Are the economic systems fundamentally too different for such 
a merging to be feasible anyway? This may seem to be the case 
if one plays down the importance of location, size and resources, 
factors which have been largely ignored, like the force of 
nationalism, by neo-classical theorists (Chicago or Marxist); 
even certain dependence writers would reject the implication that 
any government of a small country, poorly endowed by nature, 
near technologically powerful neighbours would face fundamental 
and permanent constraints. Yet the analysis above suggests that 
this is so.
Any expansion of the EEC would have major political consequences in 
the world system as a whole. It would strengthen the bargaining
position of the European core, vis a vis the two major outside»
powers, and also vis a vis the outer perkphery, facilitating 
the finance of a further extension.
Presumably, an enlarged EEC would not be very outward-looking. 
Redistributive systems inside European nations have been developed 
to some extent at the expense of international redistribution, 
and this might well also be true of the continent of Europe if it 
set up its own fiscal system. As has been pointed out above there
is to some extent a choice. The more concessions that are made
to Southern Europe, the fewer can be made to other continents
(though in the long run one could imagine an enlarged Community
stretching down to the Sahara, its natural and historical boundary).
The effect of greater self-reliance in Europe could be to stimulate
4&2 )IJnational and continental self-reliance elsewhere.
43-dj For a discussion of the world hierachy of dependence, see 
my paper "A New Look at the Three-World Classification"
IDS Bulletin Vol 7 No. 4, April 1976), a new version of 
which will appear as "Patterns of Dependence" in"Sussex 
Essays in Dependancy", ed. Jose J. Villamil (Harvester, 1978). 
Most WTestern European countries are there described as 
'semi-dependent'.
